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Conservative Crossroads: Anti-
Americanism and Anti-modernism 




America has generated a great deal of thought and writing in Quebec, 
but this commentary has never possessed the obsessiveness and anxieties 
that have characterized English Canadian writing on the United States. 
Yet both English- and French-speaking Canada share a vigorous and 
long-standing anti-American tradition. Indeed, from the eighteenth 
century to the present day, leading French Canadian writers and intel-
lectuals have offered sweeping condemnations of American society. This 
apparent continuity masks a fundamental shift in the underpinnings 
of anti-American rhetoric in Quebec: primarily a left-wing idea today, 
anti-Americanism was essentially a right-wing doctrine until the postwar 
years. This paper explores the nature and origins of anti-Americanism 
in French Canada before 1945 and finds it tied to notions of anti-
modernism on the part of French Canadian intellectuals.
Introduction
As a model or as a bête noire, America has never ceased to fascinate intel-
lectuals. This is especially true in Canada, where the American presence 
looms especially large. For English-speaking Canadians, Canada’s rela-
tionship with the United States possesses existential characteristics. 
Intellectual discourse on the nature of the Canadian experiment has 
long been preoccupied with the United States and the extent to which 
Canada should embrace or resist its neighbour to the south.
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In French-speaking Canada, discourse on the United States has 
never been fully existential. America has generated a great deal 
of thought and writing in Quebec, but this commentary has never 
possessed the obsessiveness and anxieties that have characterized 
English Canadian writing on the United States. Yet both English- and 
French-speaking Canada share a vigorous and long-standing anti-
American tradition. Indeed, from the eighteenth century to the present 
day, leading French Canadian writers and intellectuals have offered 
sweeping condemnations of American society. This apparent continuity 
masks a fundamental shift in the underpinnings of anti-American 
rhetoric in Quebec: primarily a left-wing idea today, anti-Americanism 
was essentially a right-wing doctrine until the postwar years. This 
shift occurred because America projected a different image before 
1945. Intellectuals often highlighted America’s revolutionary heritage 
and noted that the nation had embarked on a number of progressive 
experiments, including the New Deal. Moreover, until the advent of the 
Cold War, America was rarely associated with reaction or militarism, at 
least in Quebec.
American actions and policy have historically intensified or 
lessened French Canadian hostility, especially among the masses, but 
they have never proved fundamentally causal to elite anti-Americanism. 
This was particularly true after Confederation. Certainly, American 
expansionism did threaten Quebec before the Great War, but it had 
been a mitigated menace since the 1871 Treaty of Washington. Besides, 
American forcefulness has never upset all French Canadian thinkers – 
there has always been a group of continentalist intellectuals willing to 
forgive America for even its most serious misdeeds.
So what lies behind anti-Americanism? Before 1945, anti-Amer-
ican rhetoric reflected the intellectual’s reading of modernity. Indeed, in 
early French Canadian discourse, America embodied both the promise 
and the dangers of the mass age. Social change in the Republic fore-
shadowed and fostered a status revolution in French Canadian society. 
For liberals, modernity and social change were not to be feared. They 
welcomed the mass age, and embraced America and continental 
integration. Theirs was an ethos of change. The French Canadian right 
did not share their enthusiasm, and conservative anxieties regarding 
modernity found a convenient outlet in anti-American rhetoric.
Modernity is a powerful and revolutionary force. It spawns 
new social groups and new forms of expression. In doing so, it 
produces a cultural and status revolution that overwhelms tradition 
and destroys established social relations and customs. Swept up in this 
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whirlwind, conservative intellectuals feared that the modern world 
would marginalize their ideals and their voice. Searching for order amid 
what they felt was anarchy, they clung to traditional values and lashed 
out at what they believed to be the very heart of modernity: America.
Previous scholarship on anti-Americanism in Quebec has mostly 
been centred on the concept of américanité. According to Yvan Lamonde, 
who initiated the historical profession to the concept in the 1980s, 
Quebec’s history has been marked by a long struggle between those 
who embraced the province’s américanité and those who rejected it. 
Américanité refers to Quebec’s fundamentally American nature, to its 
Americanness, and should not, insists Lamonde, be confused with 
Americanization.1 From the mid-nineteenth century to the postwar years, 
the bulk of Quebec’s intellectuals would reject the province’s américanité. 
‘Chez ces élites’, writes Gérard Bouchard, whose work also explores 
Quebec’s américanité, ‘la fidélité à un passé largement imaginaire 
servit alors de programme pour les générations futures, la mémoire 
des origines se substituant à l’exaltation du rêve nord-américain’.2 As a 
result, the bulk of Quebec’s elite was out of step with both the populace 
and the continent’s wider ethos of rupture and renewal.
The américanité paradigm is not without its critics. Chief among 
them is Joseph Yvon Thériault, who argues in a 2002 monograph 
that the concept impedes the understanding of Quebec’s historical 
singularity. Moreover, he contends that Quebec’s conservative and 
clerical elite did not reject the province’s essential continentalism and 
were not completely out of step with its populace. These elites merely 
refused to accept that the American model – rupture – was endemic to 
the New World.3
I want to clarify this debate by showing that the concept of 
modernity was at the heart of intellectual discourse on the United States 
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Quebec. In particular, 
this article examines the relationship, from 1891 to 1945, between anti-
American rhetoric and anti-modernism in French Canadian thought and 
writing. During this period, Quebec experienced accelerated industriali-
zation and urbanization, large-scale immigration, technological change 
and the rise of mass culture. To the province’s intellectuals, many of 
these changes found their source and their very embodiment in the 
United States.
1891 is a significant year in the intellectual history of Canadian–
American relations. One of the most momentous federal elections in 
Canadian history was held in March of that year. The election pitted 
the governing Conservatives and their protectionist National Policy 
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against the Liberals and their promises of unrestricted reciprocity with 
the United States. The campaign revolved around anti-Americanism 
and, in a pattern that would be repeated time and again in Canadian 
politics, anti-American rhetoric was used by the Conservatives to 
attack their Liberal opponents.4 The Tories were indeed successful at 
portraying the election not as a contest between free trade and protec-
tionism, but as a mortal struggle pitting the forces of loyalty against 
those of treason.
1891 also saw the publication of two of the most important 
Canadian essays of the nineteenth century: Goldwin Smith’s Canada 
and the Canadian Question and Édouard Hamon’s Les Canadiens français 
de la Nouvelle-Angleterre. Smith’s book argued that the Dominion was 
a geographic, ethnic, economic and political absurdity whose ultimate 
destiny lay in political union with the United States. Father Hamon 
reversed Smith’s premise, arguing instead that America was moribund 
and that it was poised to dissolve into a series of nation-states, one of 
which would be French Canadian.
Both essays would have a notable impact in Canadian thought and 
writing. Smith’s work generated a great deal of debate on the future of 
the Canadian state. Indeed, more than 60 years after its publication, 
Frank Underhill argued that all modern discussion of the ‘Canadian 
question’ still revolved around the points that Smith had raised in 
1891.5 Hamon’s work fed late nineteenth-century French Canadian 
nationalism by integrating the Franco-Americans of New England into 
its messianic reasoning. Previous writing on French Canadian migration 
to the United States had tended to denigrate Franco-Americans and to 
present the exodus as a dire threat to the survival of French Canada.
The period under study encompasses the heyday of conservative 
French Canadian nationalism. Grounded in Catholicism and tradition, 
this nationalism emerged as a structured movement at the turn of the 
twentieth century. It reached its summit of influence during the Great 
Depression and began to decline in the 1940s. Anti-American sentiment 
was already part of the nationalist world view in the 1890s, but it would 
intensify in the 1920s and 1930s as a new cohort of thinkers, led by 
abbé Lionel Groulx (1878–1967), stiffened the resistance to modernity 
and America that had characterized many of their precursors.
The present article is based on a comprehensive examination 
of French Canadian thought and writing on America. Fiction and 
non-fiction published between 1891 and 1945 was examined, most 
notably through an analysis of the era’s periodical literature. Work by 
nationalist intellectuals was selected and, indeed, most of the era’s 
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leading thinkers published commentary related to the United States or 
to Canadian–American relations.6
Modernity and the anti-American ethos
‘Il faut distinguer entre l’antiaméricanisme et la critique des États-Unis’, 
warns Jean-François Revel in an essay on L’obsession anti-américaine.7 
This distinction is important, because anti-Americanism has histori-
cally implied a systematic hostility to American civilization, not merely 
a punctual criticism of American policy or life. By and large, anti-
American thinkers were opposed to the United States on a fundamental 
level and rejected the notion that French Canadians shared a wider 
américanité with the people of the United States.
It should be noted, however, that the anti-American ethos was 
neither uniformly unsympathetic nor wholly uninformed; certainly, it 
was not entirely the product of bitterness and animosity. Prominent 
anti-American thinkers visited the United States and sometimes praised 
aspects of American life. Harry Bernard (1898–1979), for instance, 
received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation to complete a 
doctoral dissertation on American literature. A conservative intellectual 
who published several scathing critiques of the United States, he was 
nonetheless attracted by the vitality of its regionalist literature.
Anti-American rhetoric frequently involved inaccurate representa-
tions and irrational delusions, but irrationality was not intrinsic to anti-
Americanism. French Canadian critics could, at times, prove surprisingly 
insightful and accurate in their assessment of American society. Besides, 
anti-American sentiment did not ultimately prevent these intellectuals 
from travelling to the United States or from interacting with Americans. 
Anti-Americanism was fundamentally different, in this regard, from 
the other major negative faiths, anti-Semitism and anti-communism, 
because it lacked their unconditional nature.8
Anti-Americanism is not an ideology per se, but a series of ideas 
woven into a wider system of beliefs.9 In pre-1945 Canada, these 
ideas were integral to the conservative ethos. Anti-Americanism was 
thus expressed most fully in the discourse of the nation’s dominant 
conservative families: English Canadian imperialism and French 
Canadian nationalism. Certainly, anti-Americanism has historically 
made for strange bedfellows, but more to the point, as sociologist Sylvie 
Lacombe has shown, nationalism and imperialism were not antithetical 
ideologies.10 Despite their fundamental divergence on the national 
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question, they both possessed an essentially anti-modern outlook, and 
anti-Americanism was their logical point of convergence.
French Canadian nationalism was fundamentally Catholic and 
was influenced by the counter-revolutionary intellectual tradition of 
France.11 This ensured that nationalists would offer a stiffer resistance 
to modernity and America than their imperialist contemporaries, whose 
outlook was more temperate in its origins. However, since English 
Canada’s ethnocultural proximity to its southern neighbour has histori-
cally made the United States the main focus of its nationalism, of its 
efforts at survival, imperialists were also more fixated on America than 
nationalists were.
The nationalist critique of American civilization was essentially 
social and cultural in nature. Nationalists saw French Canada primarily 
as a spiritual, ethnic and cultural entity, and consequently generated 
relatively little comment on American politics and government. 
Ultimately, the nature of political institutions mattered far less to 
intellectuals whose conception of la race française en Amérique was 
essentially ethnoreligious and cultural. Quebec’s anti-Americans 
were conversely preoccupied with a number of social issues, such as 
the inherent materialism of American society and the immorality of 
American culture.
It has been written that anti-Americanism is ‘a disease of the 
intellectuals’.12 In the context of pre-1945 French Canadian thought, 
however, anti-American rhetoric was in fact the symptom of a far deeper 
affliction: anti-modernism. As Jackson Lears pointed out in his 1981 
monograph on the anti-modern impulse in American thought, ‘toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, many beneficiaries of modern culture 
began to feel they were its secret victims. Among the educated and 
affluent on both sides of the Atlantic, antimodern sentiment spread’.13 
Modernity renewed the intellectual’s function, yet most turn-of-the-
century French Canadian thinkers were resolutely anti-modern, and a 
moderate traditionalism formed the core of their thought.
But why lash out at the United States? Because America, like the 
former Soviet Union, is more than a nation; historically it has embodied 
both a way of life and an ideological system with pretensions to univer-
sality.14 The American Republic is built on specific conceptions of liberty, 
equality, individualism and secularism, and has come to epitomize an 
explicitly liberal version of modernity. Moreover, as a revolutionary 
nation built on an ethos of rupture, America was quick to embrace the 
mass age and its social, cultural and technological transformations. 
Revealingly, in Quebec, the pre-1945 critique of the United States 
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was centred on a rejection of individualism, secularism, mass culture, 
materialism and industrialism. America was a nation where continuity, 
order and deference had vanished; it was the very heart of modernity.
Undoubtedly, modernity’s multiple dimensions make it a difficult 
concept to grasp. According to historian Philip Massolin it all boils down 
to ‘the replacement of Victorian society – agrarian, religious, adhering 
to a rigid set of philosophical and moral codes – with the modern 
age: industrial, secular, and anti-philosophical’. ‘From an economic 
standpoint’, he continues, ‘it pertained to the arrival of an urban and 
industrial society that replaced a hoary agrarian-merchant system. 
Closely related to the process of urban-industrialisation, modernisa-
tion also involved the rise of a consumer, scientific-materialist, and 
 technological society’.15
‘Arquée sur le présent tout en visant constamment son propre 
dépassement, sa propre négation’, writes philosopher Alexis Nouss, ‘la 
modernité n’a rien à apprendre du passé’.16 The modern ethos is thus 
obsessed with change and newness. As a result, it invariably leads to a 
penchant for rupture and, in some cases, to unabashed revolutionism. 
Unlike traditionalism, which impedes ‘l’affirmation de l’homme, du 
sujet’, and reduces ‘à la portion secondaire un espace terrestre, profane, 
matériel’.17 Modernity is anthropocentric, utilitarian and, in its moderate 
form, libertarian. Politically, it can lean towards either democracy or 
totalitarianism, but in both cases it will invariably corrode the power 
of traditional elites. In Canada, the penetration of modern ideas and 
practices was a slow and steady process that began in the late eighteenth 
century and reached its logical conclusion in the postwar era.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the attitude of many French 
Canadian intellectuals towards American civilization was not unlike the 
current outlook of countless thinkers in the developing world. In both 
instances, the dynamic nature of American society is viewed as a threat 
by elites intent on preserving existing institutions, values, practices and 
social relationships.18 In this sense, anti-American rhetoric is tied to the 
wider denunciation of the status revolution that inevitably follows the 
rise of modernity. Indeed, as Richard Hofstadter noted, late nineteenth-
century industrialization ‘transformed the old society and revolution-
ized the distribution of power and prestige’.19 Intellectuals anxiously 
observed that a new plutocracy of grandiosely wealthy men was 
emerging and stamping out traditional notions of status and deference.
Intellectual concerns regarding the ill-effects of the status 
revolution were tied to the more general middle-class anxieties that 
invariably follow rapid social change. These apprehensions were by 
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no means confined to Quebec; they could be found throughout 
Western Europe and North America. ‘In both Europe and America, the 
antimodern impulse was rooted in what can aptly be called a crisis of 
cultural authority’, writes Jackson Lears.20 The power and prestige of 
intellectuals has always rested on their role as arbiters of culture. As 
a result, many French Canadian thinkers felt dispossessed by mass, or 
as they saw it, American culture, which was completely out of their 
control. Their sense of alienation was compounded by the Protestant 
and English-speaking nature of American society, and by the weight of 
America’s cultural and economic presence in Quebec.
French Canadian intellectuals were aware that the United States 
was undergoing – indeed exporting – a status revolution, and nationalist 
critics were appalled by its implications. One of Quebec’s leading 
interwar women writers, Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé (1892–1980), 
worried about the status of refined French Canadian women in the face 
of Americanization. The status revolution, she feared, would marginalize 
women of talent and standing and, in turn, would neutralize their 
influence over society. In America, she warned the readers of the Revue 
dominicaine in 1936:
la femme du monde n’est plus la femme d’un rang social élevé, 
d’une éducation soignée, d’une culture plus poussée. L’intérêt et 
l’argent ont tout nivelé avec quelques degrés dans l’égalité suivant 
la capacité de réception et d’adaptation des uns et des autres. On 
n’est plus bien souvent qu’une femme riche, ou simplement un 
membre anonyme, falot, sans influence dans la société.21
Nationalist writers were dismayed not only by the status granted 
by American society to millionaires, but also to sports stars and 
entertainers, those adulated heroes of mass culture. Indeed, while 
industrial capitalism produced a new plutocracy and a growing urban 
proletariat, mass culture spawned the modern superstar. Like many 
interwar nationalistes, the dean of the Université de Montréal’s Faculty 
of Philosophy, Father Ceslas Forest (1885–1970), was horrified by the 
rise of the superstar and its implications for the status of the traditional 
elite. America’s scale of values, he reasoned, was upside down:
Quels sont ceux que les jeunes Américains connaissent, admirent 
et envient? Les littérateurs, les savants, les artistes? Nullement. Ce 
sont les étoiles de l’écran, pour leur beauté; les étoiles du sport, 
pour leur force ou leur adresse … Certains d’entre eux sont de 
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véritables gloires nationales. Ils jouissent d’une célébrité qu’aucun 
homme public, qu’aucun savant, qu’aucun artiste n’oserait 
ambitionner. Leurs traits que les journaux ne se lassent pas de 
reproduire sont souvent plus familiers aux jeunes américains que 
ceux du Président des États-Unis. Lors du Congrès eucharistique 
de Chicago, un journal reproduisit une photo où l’on voyait Babe 
Ruth donnant la main au Cardinal Légat. Il n’est pas douteux que 
pour un grand nombre d’Américains, tout l’honneur était pour le 
Légat du Saint-Siège.22
Catholic clergymen were among the most zealous exponents of 
anti-Americanism. Their anti-modernism was often well-honed – 
rising secularism threatened to eradicate their moral and intellec-
tual leadership. Yet anti-modern rhetoric was hardly confined to the 
presbytery. Modernity worried more than a few French Canadian intel-
lectuals, and anti-modernism dominated French Canadian discourse 
from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War.
America through French Canadian eyes
For the nationalist right, various aspects of socio-political debate, 
including issues related to gender, identity or the economy, could be 
discussed through the prism of the United States. American society 
offered an unsettling glimpse into the not-so-distant future. The United 
States, as viewed through nationalist prose, was a dark and foreboding 
place: revolution had destabilized the nation’s long-term political and 
social order; secularism and materialism were corroding the Republic’s 
moral integrity and its culture; and massive industrialization was 
creating both a disaffected and unstable proletariat and a dangerous 
plutocracy of obscenely wealthy capitalists.
For Quebec’s nationalist intellectuals, the core principles of the 
American experience – which they supposed were revolutionism, 
materialism, freedom, individualism and equality – were viewed as 
the underpinnings of an undesirable social order. They reflected a 
fundamental imbalance, a lack of order, which affected every aspect of 
American society.
American materialism was frequently denounced in French 
Canada, principally because Catholicism played such a major role 
in the formulation of nationalist discourse. ‘Le matériel accapare la 
portion la plus considérable de l’énergie américaine’, warned the 
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Université de Montréal’s professor of American literature, Hermas 
Bastien  (1897–1977), in 1936. America, he continued, was a ‘civilisa-
tion d’essence économique’ that embodied ‘le libéralisme à l’état pur, 
oublieux des personnes et des distinctions ethniques’.23 Others went 
further still. Drawing on the work of French intellectuals Jacques 
Maritain and Lucien Romier, Lionel Groulx offered a searing indictment 
of American materialism to a Catholic student association in 1928:
Bref, il semble que ce peuple vise plus bas que Dieu, ce qui, 
pour une civilisation chrétienne, est le commencement de tout 
désordre. ‘Toutes nos valeurs dépendent de la nature de notre 
Dieu’. On aura beau faire, ‘civiliser c’est spiritualiser’. Le progrès 
matériel peut y concourir dans la mesure où il permet à l’homme 
le loisir de l’âme. Mais s’il n’est employé qu’à servir la volonté de 
puissance et à combler une cupidité qui ouvre une gueule infinie, 
concupiscentia est infinita, il ramène le monde au chaos avec une 
vitesse accélérée. Lucien Romier peut écrire, s’il le veut, que ces 
conceptions de la vie ont cours chez le peuple ‘le plus moralisant 
de la terre’. Il ne saurait se cacher néanmoins que les États-Unis 
sont déjà ‘le pays où le principe de la famille semble le plus 
atteint’. Et quel fragile spiritualisme que celui qui n’a d’autre loi, 
d’autre inspiration que le make money, moralisme pragmatiste 
plutôt que religion, ne visant au surplus qu’à procurer la plus 
haute efficience du travailleur, les conditions les plus favorables à 
la grande production!24
Most nationalist observers were also reasonably critical of American 
liberty. It was generally assumed that freedom and order were out of 
balance in America, and that licentiousness was the result of American 
liberty. While serving as a chaplain in turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
Mississippi, Antonio Huot (1877–1929) warned the readers of La 
Revue canadienne in 1908 that ‘le plus grand problème moral dont la 
solution s’impose, aujourd’hui, au peuple américain est celui-ci: où 
mettre les bornes entre la liberté et la licence?’25 American society, 
he argued, was too permissive, relativistic and secular. Quebec’s 
leading late  nineteenth-century nationalist editor, Jules-Paul Tardivel 
(1851–1905), agreed: 
En Angleterre on a quelques notions de liberté. Aux États-Unis on 
parle beaucoup de liberté. La langue anglaise a même deux mots 
pour exprimer la chose: liberty et freedom; deux beaux mots, 
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certes, qui arrondissent admirablement une phrase et qui font 
toujours éclater des applaudissements pourvu qu’on les prononce 
avec un peu d’emphase. Mais la Land of freedom na réellement 
pas la moindre idée de ce que c’est que la vraie liberté   La liberté 
qui existe aux États-Unis, est la liberté libérale ou maçonnique. Et 
cette liberté là – une fausse liberté – est très nuisible à l’Église, en 
ce sens qu’elle lui enlève de nombreux enfants et affaibli l’esprit de 
foi chez beaucoup de ceux qu’elle ne lui arrache pas entièrement.26
Tardivel drew a great deal of inspiration from France’s counter-revolu-
tionary tradition and correspondingly held the idea of equality in low 
regard. He viewed American egalitarianism, like its French counterpart, 
as a radical attempt at class levelling:
Les hommes sont créés égaux dans ce sens que tous sont composés 
d’une âme et d’un corps, que tous sont mortels, que tous ont la 
même fin surnaturelle à laquelle ils ne peuvent parvenir que par la 
même aide d’En-Haut, la pratique des mêmes vertus, l’éloignement 
des mêmes péchés. Mais ce n’est pas dans ce sens métaphysique 
que les Révolutionnaires, tant Américains que Français, entendent 
l’égalité. Ils parlent de l’égalité sociale et politique. Or cette égalité 
n’a jamais existé, n’existera jamais, ne peut pas exister. Il n’y a 
peut-être pas deux hommes ‘crées égaux’ dans ce sens; il n’y a pas 
deux hommes qui possèdent exactement les mêmes qualités intel-
lectuelles, les mêmes aptitudes, les mêmes dons physiques. Tous 
ne sont pas appelés aux mêmes rôles dans la société. Le fils est-il 
‘crée égal’ à son père? L’imbécile, le minus habens, est-il l’égal, 
socialement, et politiquement parlant, de l’homme d’étude et de 
génie?27
American political institutions generated little commentary among 
Quebec’s nationalist intellectuals. American culture and education, by 
contrast, produced a great deal of writing. In the United States, argued 
nationalists, culture had become commodified and debased. America’s 
intellectual elite had lost all cultural influence and culture was designed 
to appeal to the lowest common denominator. Moreover, as America’s 
cultural influence grew after the Great War, its French Canadian 
detractors became more vocal.
Many French Canadian intellectuals were educators and, in their 
eyes, American schools and colleges embodied a distinctly new form 
of learning. American education was viewed as secular, egalitarian 
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and utilitarian. This, of course, could only draw the ire of conserva-
tive nationalists, who held these values in low regard. Education, they 
believed, was a moral and spiritual endeavour whose main purpose was 
to separate the wheat from the chaff and, ultimately, to prepare an elite 
for the challenges of leadership. It was also, insisted Jules-Paul Tardivel, 
a private endeavour. In his 1900 essay on La situation religieuse aux 
États-Unis, he fustigated ‘le principe radicalement faux et souveraine-
ment funeste qui fait de l’éducation de l’enfance une fonction de l’État, 
une œuvre politique’.28
Issues related to race and ethnicity in the United States also 
generated a fair degree of criticism in Quebec. However, many 
nationalist intellectuals suffered from an essential dilemma: how could 
they criticize America’s mistreatment of its racial minorities without 
actually appealing for racial equality? Most resolved this quandary 
with a healthy dose of paternalism. Indigenous people and African 
Americans deserved protection, but not necessarily equality.
For some turn-of-the-twentieth-century nationalists, both the 
Republic’s treatment of its black population and the African American 
himself were viewed as blemishes on American society. Indeed, though 
segregation and racial violence were denounced in nationalist writing, 
Black Americans were seldom treated as intellectual and moral equals. 
For instance, in 1902, abbé Antonio Huot condemned ‘l’infranchissable 
color line, comme on dit en ce pays, qui empêche les blancs et les noirs 
de voyager en chemin de fer, dans le même wagon, et de dîner au 
restaurant à la même table, dans les anciens États esclavagistes’. Yet, in 
the same breath, he insisted that ‘la race noire est une race inférieure, 
et il serait absolument chimérique de croire qu’il soit possible au nègre, 
placé dans les mêmes conditions que le blanc, d’atteindre le niveau 
intellectuel de celui-ci’.29 Commentary on immigration generated a 
similar dilemma. Given the presence of a large French Canadian 
immigrant population in New England, many nationalists were inclined 
to welcome the rise of multiculturalism in the United States. But these 
same observers also tended to be critical of large-scale immigration in 
Canada, so they often confined their critical remarks on immigration 
in the United States to specific groups, most notably to the Irish and to 
Jews.
In Quebec, elite hostility to the Irish frequently revolved around 
ethnic tensions within the Roman Catholic Church. Many French 
Canadian intellectuals accused the Irish-American episcopate of 
dominating the American Church and of trying to assimilate Franco-
Americans. For their part, American Jews occasionally embodied the 
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contradictory stereotypes of capitalist greed and revolutionary agitation 
in nationalist writing. For instance, in 1924, Harry Bernard argued that 
the American movie industry was controlled by Jews – ‘les pellicules 
qu’on nous montre sont, à de rares exceptions près, de provenance 
américaine, ou, pour mieux dire, judéo-américaine’ – and that Jewish 
movie moguls were enriching themselves by promoting immorality and 
subversion:
Les Juifs, outre le but de déchristianisation qu’on leur prête, ont 
pour principal objet de réaliser de l’argent et de mettre la main sur 
les finances du monde. En s’emparant du cinéma, ils ne songent 
pas tant à faire de l’art qu’à s’accaparer la richesse. Pour arriver 
à leurs fins, rien ne sera négligeable ni trop bas; ils exploiteront 
les passions sous toutes les formes, flatteront les instincts. Ils 
n’ont aucun souci de la morale ni de l’ordre, et le merveilleux 
moyen d’éducation qu’est le cinéma deviendra entre leurs mains, 
à cause de leur soif d’or et de leur rage de domination, un outil 
de dépravation, une école de corruption et de révolution. S’ils 
y voient une raison d’attirer les foules, et d’emplir la caisse, ils 
propageront les idées anti-sociales, se feront les champions du 
divorce ou de l’amour libre, à l’occasion des pratiques malthusi-
ennes. Naturellement ennemis de l’ordre, ils accorderont un appui 
bienveillant au socialisme le plus destructeur. Pour eux, il n’y a 
d’important que ce qui fait recette.30
Anti-American rhetoric also contained powerful gendered messages.31 
Many nationalists were concerned by what they saw as rising gender 
equality in the United States, which they believed was as an affront 
to traditional notions of the complementarity of the sexes. American 
women were abandoning their established role as wives and mothers; 
they were invading the public sphere and, worse still, were given to 
promiscuity. The implication was clear: modernity was corrosive to 
traditional gender relations; it was turning women into men.
Nationalists placed a great deal of importance on the role of 
women in la survivance, and perceived American attitudes towards 
gender equality were viewed as a threat to the nation. On occasion, 
the issue would surface in French Canadian literature. In La campagne 
canadienne (1925), for instance, Jesuit Adélard Dugré (1881–1970) 
contrasted gender relations in the United States and Canada and 
warned his readers against emigration and mixed marriages. During 
a trip to rural Quebec, the novel’s protagonist, Franco-American 
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physician François Barré, is awakened to the harsh reality of his family’s 
degeneracy:
Devant ces hommes si simplement maîtres chez eux, qui avaient 
une idée si nette et si ferme de ce que doit être la famille, le 
docteur américain se sentait humilié de l’anarchie qui régnait 
à son foyer. Vraiment sa femme y prenait trop de place. Qu’elle 
eût une voix prépondérante quand il s’agissait des choses de son 
ressort, passe. Quelle s’occupât seule de meubler la maison, de 
choisir ou de renvoyer les servantes, qu’elle allât même jusqu’à 
déterminer l’emploi des soirées libres, le but et l’itinéraire de 
leurs voyages, passe encore; mais qu’elle se chargeât d’orienter la 
carrière de son mari, de choisir sa clientèle et de lui indiquer son 
gagne-pain, c’était trop fort. En cela c’est lui, François, qui devait 
être juge suprême et maître souverain. Il était temps que Fanny 
l’apprît et l’acceptât. Il y a des cas majeurs où la femme doit obéir 
et se taire, si elle ne peut pas approuver et se réjouir.32
In Dugré’s novel, François Barré’s son is out of control and his wife is 
disobedient, domineering, irreligious and immodest. The Barrés were, it 
seemed, a typical American family.
French Canadian nationalists were also quick to identify America 
with the evils of machinisme and the unregulated market. Indeed, though 
they were very much in favour of free enterprise, nationalists regularly 
denounced industrial gigantism and monopolistic capitalism, preferring 
instead a system where industry was more decentralized, both in terms of 
its ownership and of its location. American investment in Canadian industry 
was furthering the economic marginalization of French Canadians. It was 
upsetting the balance between urban and rural society, and was producing 
both obscene wealth and a restless and underprivileged working class.
The Great Depression confirmed nationalist apprehensions 
regarding massive industrialization and laissez-faire capitalism. 
Paul-Henri Guimont (1906–2000), for instance, blamed the crisis on 
American industrial gigantism. A rising star at Montreal’s hotbed of 
Catholic economic thought, the École des Hautes Études  commerciales, 
Guimont argued in 1935 that America had broken the natural equilibrium 
between agriculture and industry. Indeed, an over-reliance on massive 
and heavily standardized industrial production had been its undoing:
Dans la formation de son économie, elle avait fondé sur la 
formule nouvelle et vulgaire de la standardisation industrielle 
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d’extravagantes et insatiables ambitions. Elle avait méprisé le 
génie créateur et conservateur de la vieille Europe. L’originalité 
dans la conception lui était inconnue. Elle s’était gratifiée d’une 
superstructure industrielle excessive à laquelle correspondait une 
population trop peu nombreuse.33
French Canada and the United States
Negative assessments of American society served a higher purpose. 
They helped French Canadian intellectuals define their national 
experience, most notably by presenting Quebec as a fundamen-
tally conservative, anti-American entity. Unlike the United States, 
Quebec was founded on the bedrock of tradition and continuity. For 
Father Adélard Dugré, the contrast between these two entities was 
evident: French Canadian society was ‘simple, patriarcale, essentiel-
lement catholique et conservatrice’, while American society was 
‘éblouissante et tapageuse, protestante et matérialiste’. Quebec, as the 
inheritor of pre-revolutionary France, was the embodiment of Catholic 
tradition, while America was the quintessence of both Protestantism 
and modernity. Accordingly, Dugré began La Campagne canadienne 
with the following preface:
Il existe actuellement, dans l’Amérique du Nord, deux civilisations 
fort différentes: l’une est représentée par cent millions d’Anglo-
Saxons, l’autre par trois ou quatre millions de Canadiens d’origine 
française. Ce qui distingue ces deux groupes inégaux, ce n’est pas 
seulement la langue qu’ils parlent et la foi religieuse de la grande 
majorité de ceux qui les composent, c’est aussi la diversité dans les 
manières d’agir, la divergence de vues dans la façon d’envisager la 
vie, ses jouissances et ses devoirs. On a hérité, au Canada français, 
du tempérament et des traditions de la France catholique du dix-
septième siècle; on a hérité, chez les Américains anglo-saxons, 
du libre examen et de l’esprit utilitaire des Anglais du règne 
d’Élisabeth … Cette opposition dans le caractère des deux groupes 
ethniques se trahit constamment dans la pratique de la vie: 
l’exercice du culte divin, les coutumes familiales, l’éducation, la 
littérature, le commerce et la réclame, les procédés électoraux, les 
fêtes populaires, tout traduit à l’observateur le moins attentif les 
profondes différences qui distinguent le Canadien resté français de 
l’Américain-type.34
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But French Canadian distinctiveness was not only based on Catholicism 
and French language and culture, it was also racial. Americans, it was 
argued, were Anglo-Saxons, and French Canadians, as Latins, were 
their racial antipodes. The two races, indeed, possessed fundamentally 
different characteristics. As Father Édouard Hamon (1891–1904) noted 
in Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre (1891), ‘le caractère 
français est juste aux antipodes du caractère anglo-saxon-américain. 
Autant l’un est gai, expansif, sans souci, compatissant avec les misères 
des autres, prêt aux sacrifices les plus généreux, autant l’autre est froid, 
concentré, calculateur et égoïste’.35 These racial differences would 
inevitably spawn two fundamentally distinct societies.
Nationalist intellectuals believed that French Canadian distinctive-
ness was threatened by the United States, and Americanization was a 
major issue of concern in Quebec. This was particularly true during the 
interwar years, when nationalists were alarmed by the rapid spread of 
American popular culture. Americanization, it was argued, was a sly 
form of assimilation precisely because it relied on seemingly benign (i.e. 
cultural) means of propagation. Indeed, as journalist and literary critic 
Victor Barbeau (1894–1994) noted in 1922, while Britain’s attempts to 
assimilate French Canada through violence and legislation had failed, 
American efforts to weaken French Canadian survivance with movies, 
jazz, chewing gum, comics, soft drinks, chorus girls and baseball were 
succeeding:
Ce sont eux, en tout cas, que les Américains y emploient. Le 
pays en est infesté d’une rive à l’autre. Vassal économique des 
États-Unis, le Canada est en passe de devenir également son vassal 
spirituel. Canadiens-anglais et Canadiens-français ne pensent, 
ne vivent, ne jugent que par leurs voisins. Dans tous les étages 
de la société leur influence pénètre et se développe. On ne va 
au cinéma que pour voir glorifier leurs prouesses, admirer leur 
ingéniosité, applaudir leur drapeau. On ne lit leurs journaux, leurs 
revues que pour apprendre les derniers de leurs exploits, les plus 
beaux de leurs accomplissements politiques ou sportifs. Ils nous 
écrasent de leur vie nationale. Nous ne semblons exister que pour 
nous féliciter de les avoir comme voisins et nous appliquer à leur 
ressembler le plus possible.36
But Americanization did not only rely on cultural means to propagate 
itself. Emigration and American investment were also cited as vectors 
of Canadian–American convergence. Even women were occasionally 
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accused of contributing to Quebec’s Americanization. ‘La femme est l’un 
des grands facteurs responsables de l’américanisme au Canada’, wrote 
Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé in 1936. ‘L’américanisme’, she continued, 
‘a désaxé la femme. En lui proposant toutes les libertés, en la sortant 
du foyer dont elle est la reine et maîtresse naturelle, en obnubilant sa 
conscience et troublant sa foi, il brisa du même coup la famille, aggrava 
le problème économique et disqualifia la société’.37
The growth of international unionism also angered many on the 
nationalist right. Quebec’s Roman Catholic clergy viewed American 
unions as dangerous agents of secularism and assimilation, and saw 
itself as engaged in a life and death struggle with international unionism 
for the soul of Quebec’s proletariat. Indeed, as far as the Catholic Church 
was concerned, issues related to labour and industry were inseparable from 
religion. As a result, theological arguments dominated nationalist criticism 
of international unionism. The editor of Le Devoir, Henri Bourassa (1868–
1952), summed up the nationalist position in a 1919 pamphlet:
Le syndicalisme international et neutre est pernicieux en soi et 
dans tous les pays, parce qu’il ne tient aucun compte, dans la 
recherche des avantages qu’il propose à ses adhérents, de Dieu, de 
la famille et de la patrie, ces trois assises fondamentales de l’ordre 
social chrétien. Le péril est incomparablement plus grand ici que 
partout ailleurs, à cause de l’unique voisinage des États-Unis. 
Le syndicalisme international veut dire, au Canada, le complet 
assujettissement des travailleurs canadiens aux caprices et à la 
domination du travail américain syndiqué. C’est l’une des mani-
festations les plus complètes et les plus prenantes de la conquête 
morale et économique du Canada par les États-Unis.38
Nationalist intellectuals refused to accept the notion that class solidarity 
could transcend borders and religious denominations, and they were 
fervently opposed to the establishment of a secular, American space 
within Quebec’s proletariat. Secularism, indeed, was a veritable 
Pandora’s box. ‘La neutralité a fait du syndicalisme américain un champ 
propice à la contagion des erreurs (révolutionnaires, socialistes)’, wrote 
Catholic labour leader Alfred Charpentier (1888–1982) in 1920, ‘il 
n’aspire sans cesse qu’à des réformes de plus en plus égalitaires; il se 
fait de la sorte, plus ou moins à son insu, le précurseur du socialisme’.39 
International unions, it was argued, had a penchant for strikes, violence 
and, ultimately, for subversion. Indeed, in nationalist prose, America 
itself was often viewed as a terreau fertile for radicalism.
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Conclusion
The rise of modernity invariably produces two basic sensibilities. In 
pre-1945 Quebec, however, the essential dichotomy between modern 
and anti-modern thought was expressed, in part, by a debate centred on 
the province’s américanité. The thrust of anti-Americanism in Quebec 
was undeniably anti-modern. During the period under study, French 
Canada was a traditional society undergoing rapid change and the 
disintegration of premodern social relations. American society came to 
embody these changes to the French Canadian intellectual. As a result, 
most French Canadian writing on America contained an encrypted 
commentary on the mass age.
In early twentieth-century Quebec, where political institutions 
were not generally viewed as vital elements of national distinctiveness, 
social and cultural affairs dominated writing on the United States. Anti-
American rhetoric was present in nationalist writing before the Great 
War, but it intensified in the 1920s and 1930s, as the American presence 
in the province increased and fears related to cultural Americanization 
and the economic marginalization of French Canadians grew. With the 
weakening of imperialist sentiment in postwar English-speaking Canada, 
many intellectuals began to regard the United States as the chief threat 
to French Canadian survivance. By the 1940s, however, anti- Americanism 
had begun to decline as nationalist rhetoric became less intensely 
Catholic and conservative. This would not result in its disappearance 
from French Canadian discourse, however, and the anti- American torch 
would be passed on to Quebec’s nascent left during the Quiet Revolution. 
Indeed, despite its many ups and downs, anti- Americanism has remained 
present in French Canadian discourse since the late eighteenth century. 
America’s symbolic significance, coupled with its economic and cultural 
presence in Quebec, has ensured this continuity.
Notes
 1 Yvan Lamonde, Ni avec eux ni sans eux: le 
Québec et les États-Unis (Montreal: Nuit 
Blanche, 1996), 11.
 2 Gérard Bouchard, ‘Le Québec comme 
collectivité neuve. Le refus de 
l’américanité dans le discours de la 
survivance’, in Québécois et Américains: la 
culture québécoise aux XIXe et XXe siècles, 
eds. Gérard Bouchard and Yvan Lamonde 
(Montreal: Fides, 1995), 16.
 3 Joseph Yvon Thériault, Critique de 
l’américanité. Mémoire et démocratie au 
Québec (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 
2002), passim.
 4 Patricia K. Wood, ‘Defining “Canadian”: 
Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John 
A. Macdonald’s Nationalism’, Journal of 
Canadian Studies 36 (2001): 49–50.
 5 Frank Underhill, ‘Canada and the 
Canadian Question, 1954’, in his In 
 Conservative Crossroads  23
Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1960), 214.
 6 Pascal Ory’s definition of the intellectual 
has been applied to this study. 
‘L’intellectuel’, Ory argues, ‘est un homme 
du culturel mis en situation d’homme du 
politique, producteur et consommateur 
d’idéologie’. (Pascal Ory and Jean-
François Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en 
France, de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours 
[Paris: Armand Colin, 1986], 10). On the 
whole, the intellectuals examined in this 
study were essentially cultural figures – 
journalists, clergymen, etc. – who became 
involved in socio-political debate without 
directly entering the world of partisan 
politics.
 7 Jean-Francois Revel, L’obsession anti-
américaine: son fonctionnement, ses causes, 
ses inconséquences (Paris: Plon, 2002), 247.
 8 Pascal Ory, ‘From Baudelaire to Duhamel: 
An Unlikely Antipathy’, in The Rise 
and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: 
A Century of French Perception, eds. 
Denis Lacorne et al. (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 42.
 9 Indeed, as historian Réal Bélanger 
notes, ‘l’antiaméricanisme et le 
proaméricanisme n’ont de signification 
que dans leur rapport avec un plus 
grand ensemble idéologique qui leur sert 
de référent’. (Bélanger, ‘Le spectre de 
l’américanisation: commentaire’, in Les 
rapports culturels entre le Québec et les 
États-Unis, ed. Claude Savary [Quebec: 
IQRC, 1984], 168).
10 Sylvie Lacombe, La rencontre de deux 
peuples élus. Comparaison des ambitions 
nationale et impériale au Canada entre 
1896 et 1920 (Quebec: Presses de 
l’Université Laval, 2002), passim.
11 Nevertheless, as Pierre Trépanier 
notes, ‘l’ultramontanisme, comme le 
conservatisme modéré, avait pour 
tradition de référence non seulement la 
contre-révolution française, mais surtout 
une synthèse proprement canadienne-
française intégrant partiellement le 
traditionalisme britannique, avec 
sa singularité: le parlementarisme. 
L’ultracisme canadien-français ne 
coïncidera jamais parfaitement avec son 
homologue français. Joseph de Maistre, 
oui, mais aussi Edmund Burke et Louis-
Hippolyte La Fontaine, dont la conquête 
de la responsabilité ministérielle a été 
saluée comme une victoire nationale, 
nationaliste même’. (Trépanier, 
‘Notes pour une histoire des droites 
intellectuelles canadiennes-françaises à 
travers leurs principaux représentants 
(1770–1970)’, Cahiers des Dix 48 
[1993]: 122.)
12 J. Van Houten quoted in J.L. Granatstein, 
Yankee Go Home: Canadians and Anti-
Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 
1996), 6.
13 Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: 
Antimodernism and the Transformation of 
American Culture, 1880–1920 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1981), xiii.
14 Guy Sorman, ‘United States: Model 
or Bête Noire’, in The Rise and Fall of 
French Anti-Americanism, ed. Lacorne 
et al., 213. According to Stephen Brooks, 
‘America as a “city upon a hill” and 
America as an “evening land” are two 
sides of the same coin. The coin involves 
the utopian expectations associated 
with America, or what [I call] the 
mythic meaning of America. Most of the 
millions of people who have left their 
native countries for America, to live or 
visit, have come in search of something 
far less grand than utopia. But foreign 
observers of the American scene … have 
understood that America represented an 
important new chapter in human history 
and that its potential for greatness 
lay not in economic brawn or military 
prowess, not in its engineering marvels 
or its ability to assimilate millions of 
immigrants from countless nationalities, 
but in the ideals embodied in its social 
structures and political institutions’. 
(Brooks, America Through Foreign Eyes: 
Classical Interpretations of American 
Political Life [Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2002], 150).
15 Philip Massolin, Canadian Intellectuals, 
the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge 
of Modernity, 1939–1970 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001), 3.
16 Alexis Nouss, La modernité (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1995), 
15, 19.
17 Yvan Lamonde, ‘La modernité au 
Québec: pour une histoire des brèches 
(1895–1950)’, in L’avènement de la 
modernité culturelle au Québec, eds. Yvan 
Lamonde and Esther Trépanier (Quebec: 
Presses de l’Université Laval, 1986), 307.
18 Alvin Z. Rubinstein and D.E. Smith, 
‘Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a 
Phenomenon’, in Anti-Americanism in the 
Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign 
24 London JoUrnaL oF Canadian stUdies,  voLUMe 32
Policy, eds. A.Z. Rubinstein and D.E. 
Smith (New York: Praeger, 1985), 17.
19 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 
from Bryan to FDR (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1955), 136
20 Lears, No Place of Grace, 5.
21 Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé, ‘Notre 
américanisation par la femme’, Revue 
dominicaine XLII (1936): 146.
22 Ceslas Forest, ‘Notre américanisation 
par les sports’, Revue dominicaine XLII 
(1936): 350–1.
23 Hermas Bastien, ‘L’américanisation par 
la philosophie’, Revue dominicaine XLII 
(1936): 201.
24 Lionel Groulx, Nos responsabilités 
intellectuelles (Montreal: L’Action 
française, 1928), 28.
25 Antonio Huot, ‘Aux États-Unis: Les 
universités’, La Revue canadienne, New 
Series, II (1908): 554.
26 Jules-Paul Tardivel, La situation religieuse 
aux Etats-Unis. Illusions et réalités 
(Quebec: Cadieux et Derome, 1900), 38, 
195–6.
27 Tardivel, La situation religieuse aux Etats-
Unis, 128.
28 Tardivel, La situation religieuse aux Etats-
Unis, 153.
29 Antonio Huot, ‘Mœurs américaines. 
Blancs et noirs’, La Nouvelle-France I 
(1902): 370, 376.
30 Harry Bernard, ‘L’ennemi dans la place: 
Théâtre et cinéma’, L’Action française XII 
(1924): 70, 71–2.
31 Wood, ‘Defining “Canadian”’, 53.
32 Adélard Dugré, La campagne canadienne. 
Croquis et leçons (Montreal: Le Messager, 
1925), 202.
33 Paul-Henri Guimont, ‘Coup d’œil sur 
l’Amérique contemporaine’, L’Actualité 
économique XI (1935): 55.
34 Dugré, La campagne canadienne, 5–6, 
234.
35 Édouard Hamon, Les Canadiens-Français 
de la Nouvelle-Angleterre (Quebec: N.S. 
Hardy, 1891), 120.
36 [Victor Barbeau], ‘La politique: La 
méthode américaine’, Les Cahiers de Turc 
V (1922): 31, 34.
37 Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé, ‘Notre 
américanisation par la femme’, 132.
38 Henri Bourassa, Syndicats nationaux ou 
internationaux? (Montreal: Le Devoir, 
1919), 3.
39 Alfred Charpentier, De l’internationalisme 
au nationalisme (Montreal: L’Action 
française, 1920), 13.
Note on contributor
Damien-Claude Bélanger is an Associate Professor of Canadian history at the University of 
Ottawa and the co-founder of Mens: revue d’histoire intellectuelle et culturelle. A graduate of the 
Université de Montréal and McGill, his research interests include French Canadian intellectual 
history and Canadian–American relations. He is the author of two monographs, Prejudice and 
Pride: Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States, 1891–1945 (University of Toronto Press, 
2011) and Thomas Chapais, historien (Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, forthcoming) and is 
currently working on a history of loyalism in French Canada.
